Productivity dispersion among seemingly similar …rms has been widely documented and often viewed as symptomatic of an underlying misallocation of resources. Why does a …rm that is marginally more productive than others not expand? Following Chandler (1962) , I argue that in order to produce e¢ ciently, a large …rm must decentralize operating decisions to managers. In order to decentralize, a …rm's owner must make credible promises to reward judicious use of the …rm's resources, and such credibility may be in short supply. I therefore develop a model of relational contracts in a competitive environment with heterogeneous …rms. Credibility requires collateral, which takes the form of future competitive rents. In equilibrium, competitive rents are allocated ine¢ ciently: high-ability …rms are better able to solve their credibility problem than low-ability …rms and therefore, the marginal collateral value of competitive rents is not equalized across …rms. Improvements in formal contracting institutions reduce the importance of credibility and therefore disproportionately bene…t low-ability …rms. Cross-country di¤erences in contracting institutions can therefore partially explain the observed pattern that productivity dispersion is greater in developing countries. (JEL D21, D24, L14, L22)
Introduction
In order for a large …rm to produce e¢ ciently, the owner must decentralize daily operating decisions to a team of managers (Chandler (1962) ). In the absence of perfect formal contracts, decentralization requires trust: the owner must trust that the managers will not squander the …rm's resources, and the managers must trust that judicious use of resources will be rewarded appropriately. Recent empirical work by Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (Forthcoming) demonstrates that lack of trust constrains …rm size by limiting decentralization.
1 As a result, …rms that are highly productive at the margin may like to expand but be unable to do so. In this paper, I develop a simple model of relational contracts (informal, self-enforcing agreements) in a competitive environment to analyze the consequences of limited trust on the steady-state distribution of …rm size and productivity. I model trust as credibility in a repeated game (Bull (1987) , MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) , Levin (2003) ) between a …rm's owner and a team of managers. The owner allocates some resources to each manager. He would like each manager to utilize those resources appropriately, but formal contracts are unavailable. He can promise to pay a pre-speci…ed reward if the manager appropriately utilizes the resources he has been allocated. 2 The owner lacks commitment, so in a one-shot game, after the manager's utilization choice has been made, the owner would always prefer not to pay the reward (i.e., to renege) and will do so; forward-looking managers working for such a " ‡y-by-night" …rm will squander their …rm's resources and therefore will not be given any to begin with. A long-lived …rm, however, can make credible promises of future rewards, since failure to uphold promises may put the future of the …rm at stake: the future competitive rents the …rm generates can thus be used as collateral in the …rm's promises. Competitive rents are endogenous. Output generated by the owner-manager problem is sold into a competitive product market. The market consists of many …rm owners of heterogeneous ability, 3 and production exhibits decreasing returns to scale. As in Lucas (1978) , this implies that …rms of di¤erent total factor productivity levels will coexist in equilibrium. The novel element of this model is that …rms of di¤erent marginal productivities will coexist in equilibrium, even though all …rms face the same factor prices: heterogeneous …rms will be 1 Firm owners may lock up spare parts for machines, depriving local managers of the ability to perform repairs when a machine breaks down, for if they did not, the managers might steal the parts, sell them, and replace them with low-quality parts. Owners require managers to obtain approval to make capital investments greater than $500, hire non-temporary personnel, or make sales and marketing decisions.
2 Discretionary payments take the form of monetary bonuses in the literature on relational incentive contracts. These payments can be interpreted more broadly as raises, promotions, additional freedom, policy commitments, and improved working conditions that can be awarded to an agent in a contingent way.
3 Ability can be thought of as anything that is valuable for production, scarce, and non-transferable.
heterogeneously constrained, and therefore there will be misallocation of production. The credibility necessary to sustain decentralization is determined by each …rm's potential future competitive rents. Competitive rents, credibility, …rms'decentralization levels, and therefore …rms'productivity levels are jointly determined in industry equilibrium. Because competitive rents serve as collateral, their allocation matters for e¢ ciency. Initial advantage begets further advantage: in equilibrium, high-ability owners achieve high levels of rents and hence collateral, which in turn gives rise to even greater rents. This "Matthew E¤ect" (Merton (1968) ) is limited by decreasing returns to scale, but it nevertheless results in aggregate ine¢ ciencies: competitive rents are allocated too progressively. High-ability …rms overproduce, imposing …rst-order pecuniary externality losses on low-ability …rms.
Low-ability …rms face relatively tighter credibility constraints. Their productivity is therefore relatively more sensitive to changes in factors that determine competitive rents, such as shifts in aggregate demand. Improvements in formal contracting institutions reduce the importance of credibility in sustaining decentralization and therefore disproportionately bene…t low-ability …rms, leading to a greater dispersion of total factor productivity in weaker contracting environments. Cross-country di¤erences in contracting institutions can thus partially explain the observed pattern that productivity dispersion is more pronounced in developing countries (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (Forthcoming) ). Further, di¤erences in formal contracting institutions also lead to di¤erences in the price level. I show that when one takes price e¤ects into account, improvements in formal contracting institutions also leads to compression in …rm size: small …rms produce more and large …rms produce less. This paper is related to the recent literature on misallocation and economic growth (Banerjee and Du ‡o (2005) , Jeong and Townsend (2007) , Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) , and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) ), which has argued that cross-country di¤erences in the ability to allocate resources e¢ ciently across …rms can explain a substantial portion of the di¤erences in per-capita GDP. These papers argue that misallocation of productive resources is ubiquitous, but it is more pronounced in developing countries than in developed countries. Hsieh and Klenow show that improving the allocation of capital and labor in China and India to U.S. levels would result in a one-o¤ increase in per-capita GDP by 30-50% and 40-60% respectively.
To design e¤ective policy for improving the allocation of resources, we need to understand why resources were not allocated e¢ ciently to begin with. Several recent papers in the macro tradition (Banerjee and Moll (2010) , Moll (2011) , Buera, Kaboski, and Shin (2011) , and Midrigan and Xu (2010) ) have focused on the role of underdeveloped …nancial markets. 4 Others include Peters (2011b) , who argues that in a monopolistic-competition framework, heterogeneity in entry rates leads to heterogeneity in markups, which in turn leads to a distortion in relative output prices and thus misallocation. Collard-Wexler, Asker, and De Loecker (2011) argue that much of the misallocation is driven by adjustment costs. Guner, Ventura, and Xu (2008) and Garicano, Lelarge and Van Reenen (2011) highlight the importance of existing size-dependent policies on whether or not …rms operate at their e¢ cient scale.
The normative implications of each of these explanations di¤er. For example, if misallocation is driven solely by adjustment costs, then there is little scope for bene…cial policy. If, on the other hand, heterogeneity in markups is the driving factor, then we want to understand why there is heterogeneity in entry rates and perhaps remedy this by selectively reducing entry barriers in certain industries. If underdeveloped …nancial markets are the problem, then top-down improvements in …nancial markets could reduce misallocation. My model generates persistent misallocation in a perfectly competitive environment with no adjustment costs or credit rationing and is therefore complementary to existing views. It suggests that policy should focus on improving the quality of formal contracting institutions. Absent such policy instruments, productive e¢ ciency can be improved through policies that reallocate pro…ts among heterogeneous …rms. This paper is also related to the literature on the large and persistent di¤erences in productivity levels across producers (for a recent empirically oriented survey, see Syverson (2011) ), and it is methodologically similar to Board and Meyer-ter-Vehn (2011) , who augment Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) 's model of e¢ ciency wages with on-the-job search and show that wage, and hence productivity, dispersion emerges in a stationary industry equilibrium, even with ex ante identical …rms. In their model, credible incentives are derived from endogenous quasi-rents: workers are motivated by the prospect of obtaining or losing high-paying jobs. In my model, credibility is derived from competitive rents: a …rm upholds its promises out of fear of losing future pro…ts. Both quasi-rents and competitive rents are important in determining the strength of ongoing relationships, and since their determinants di¤er, these approaches are complementary. Also closely related are Chassang (2010) and Gibbons and Henderson (2011) , who argue that …rm-level heterogeneity in productivity is due to di¤er-ences in (ex ante identical) …rms'success in developing relational contracts that put them on the production possibilities frontier.
5 I assume that all …rms succeed in implementing optimal relational contracts. Small di¤erences in the ability of …rm owners translate into best ideas should be able to save their way out of capital constraints. This argument underpins the title of Banerjee and Moll (2010) 's paper, "Why Does Misallocation Persist?" 5 Also related is Ellison and Holden (Forthcoming) , who show the potential for path-dependence in the e¢ ciency of organizational rules. di¤erences in continuation values and potentially large di¤erences in decentralization and productivity. Relational incentive contracts can therefore amplify existing di¤erences. The analysis in this paper is silent on …rm dynamics, unlike Chassang (2010) and Ellison and Holden (Forthcoming) . It provides a theory of steady-state misallocation, not a theory of the process that leads to it.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literatures on …rm governance in industry equilibrium (Grossman and Helpman (2002) , Legros and Newman (2012) , and Gibbons, Holden, and Powell (Forthcoming) ) and on the aggregate implications of contractual incompleteness (Caballero and Hammour (1998) , Francois and Roberts (2003) , Cooley, Marimon, and Quadrini (2004) , and Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007) ). My analysis is most similar to Acemoglu, Antras, and Helpman (2007) , who examine the role of incomplete contracts and unresolved hold-up on technology adoption. In contrast, I explore how the success of attempts to resolve contractual incompleteness using relational contracts varies with underlying …rm characteristics and with the competitive environment in which the …rm operates.
Section 2 sets up the basic model and de…nes terminology. Section 3 characterizes the solution in the complete-contracts case. Section 4 analyzes optimal relational incentive contracts in the absence of formal contracts, and section 5 explores the e¢ ciency of the resulting industry equilibrium. Section 6 explores empirical implications of the model and extends the model to incorporate the possibility of formal contracting. Section 7 concludes.
Setup and Technology
There is a unit mass of …rms, indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. Each …rm is run by a risk-neutral owner who is the residual claimant. Output requires capital and managers, who must be given resources in order to be productive. Contracting institutions are weak, and therefore judicious use of resources by managers cannot be directly contracted upon. Throughout, we will assume that there is a large enough mass of risk-neutral managers so that in equilibrium, they are indi¤erent between working and not. Play is in…nitely repeated, and we denote by t = 1; 2; 3; : : : the period. All players share a common discount factor, which we will express in terms of a discount rate 1 1+r with r < 1. The product of the owner-manager problem is output, which is homogeneous across …rms and sold into a competitive product market. Aggregate demand is assumed to be stationary, D t (p t ) = D (p t ), where p t is the output price in period t, downward-sloping (D 0 < 0), and generated by consumers who have quasilinear preferences. Each period consists of seven stages. In the …rst stage, owner i decides whether or not to pay the …xed cost of production, F . If he chooses to, in the second stage, he decides how much capital K it to rent at constant rental rate R and the mass M it of managers to whom he would like to make an o¤er. In stage 3, the owner o¤ers each manager m 2 [0; , …rm i's production in period t is given by
Throughout, make the following assumption. Assumption 1. < 1 . Assumption 1 ensures that utilization levels across managers are substitutes. Further, it is a su¢ cient condition for the …rst-order conditions for the unconstrained problem to be su¢ cient. In period t, if owner i pays all rewards, his pro…ts are
We will analyze the owner's optimal solution to this problem when di¤erent performance measures are available. The next section analyzes the case where itm ^ itm =^ itm , so that formal contracts can be written directly on utilization levels (obviating the need to use relational incentives), and the section that follows examines the pure relational incentives case, where itm ^ itm is constant. Intermediate cases are considered in Section 5.
Throughout, I assume that the rental rate of capital is exogenously given and constant at R.
9 Additionally, I will maintain the assumption of perfect competition in the product market. Alternatively, as I show in Appendix B, this model is equivalent to a monopolistic competition model, where ' i is a function of the size of the market for the variety that …rm i produces. Finally, the mass of …rms in the economy is …xed at 1. In Appendix C, I allow for endogenous …rm entry. As in Hopenhayn (1992) , a …rm can pay a sunk cost F e to enter the market and draw a value ' i . The resulting mass of entrants is determined by an indi¤erence condition.
Complete Contracts
As a benchmark, consider the case where itm ^ itm =^ itm , so that the owner can use the contractible portion of the payment, s itm , to both pin each manager to his (IR) constraint and directly choose his utilization level (say, by setting s itm ^ itm 6 = itm = 1). Because in this case, there are no intertemporal linkages in the problem, each …rm can solve its pro…t-maximization problem period-by-period. Given a price level p t , owner i wants to choose M it ; f itm g m2[0;M it ] , and K it to solve the following problem.
(1) subject to each manager's individual rationality constraint, which will hold with equality:
By Assumption 1, the …rm's problem is concave in f itm g m2[0;M it ] , and managers are symmetric, so any optimal solution must satisfy itm = it for all m. Recognizing this and substituting the (IR) constraint into (1), the problem becomes
There will be some shutdown value of ability, ' S , for which ' i < ' S implies that a …rm with potential ' i should optimally not produce. The solution to this problem is captured in the following proposition.
The unconstrained solution to …rm i's problem is
S , …rm i optimally does not produce. Equilibrium total factor productivity for a …rm with ability ' i is given by
Since the solution to the period t problem does not depend on variables from any other period, and demand is stationary, output prices will be constant, p t = p for all t. A competitive equilibrium is then a price level p and a vector of …rm-level choices fK i ; M i ; i g i2 [0;1] such that these choices are optimal given the price level, and the price level clears the market in each period. It is straightforward to verify that a competitive equilibrium exists and is unique.
It is worth noting that …rm i's equilibrium total factor productivity depends only on the …rm's ability, ' i , and the …rst-best level of resource utilization, F B . It does not depend on the interest rate, r, or the equilibrium prices, p. This will stand in contrast to the results of the following section, where managers'utilization choices are not directly contractible.
Relational Incentive Contracts
We now turn to the heart of the model and assume that itm = ; for all^ itm . Resource utilization is non-contractible, and therefore s itm is constant. The owner would like to incentivize his agents to utilize resources, but he can only do so by making a promise that he will pay a pre-speci…ed reward if the manager chooses a particular utilization level. The owner cannot commit to doing so, so in a one-shot game, after the manager's utilization choice has been sunk, the owner would always prefer not to pay the reward, and thus, a forward-looking manager will not choose a positive utilization level (and therefore the owner will not entrust any resources to the manager). However, the owner may use future competitive rents as a partial commitment device. His ability to do so depends on the clarity with which his failure to pay promised rewards gets communicated to his current and potential future managers. Throughout, I make the following assumption of perfect observability. Assumption 2. A …rm's potential future managers commonly observe the entrusted resources and utilization choices of individual managers and whether or not they were paid their promised rewards.
This assumption ensures that the totality of a …rm's future competitive rents can be used as collateral in its promises. Relaxing Assumption 2 to the case of all-or-nothing public monitoring makes the goal of dynamic enforcement more di¢ cult to achieve but does not qualitatively change any of the results (see Appendix A).
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In addition, I assume that managers can be rematched to another …rm at no cost, which 10 Bull (1987) justi…es this form of monitoring in an overlapping-generations model in which young workers, who are eventually promoted to management, observe whether the promises made to the previous generation of managers were upheld.
11 Ghosh and Ray (1996) and Kranton (1996) show that completely shutting down observability with respect to future potential managers can lead to interesting relationship dynamics. prevents the …rm from leveraging quasi-rents derived from labor market frictions to aid in dynamic enforcement-unlike in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) , unemployment can not serve as a worker discipline device. I similarly assume that capital is not …rm-speci…c.
Assumption 3. Managers can be rematched with a di¤erent …rm at no cost. Capital is not …rm-speci…c.
Dynamic Enforcement
Under what conditions does the owner have the credibility necessary to ensure that managers will utilize all the resources they have been entrusted with? To examine this, we will look for an equilibrium in which a …rm's managers begin by fully utilizing the resources they have been entrusted with, and owners respond to this by rewarding them as promised. In any given period, if in the past, the owner failed to pay any number of managers their promised reward following full utilization, players revert to the unique SPNE of the state game: each manager utilizes zero resources, the owner does not entrust any resources to any manager, managers reject all o¤ers, and the owner does not pay the …xed cost of production. Such a trigger strategy constitutes an optimal penal code (Abreu (1988) ). 1213 In this section, we will derive conditions under which utilization levels [ it ] m2M it are sustainable as part of a relational contract. Suppose manager m believes the owner will pay reward b itm if and only if he chooses utilization level^ itm = itm . Then he will choose^ itm = itm (instead of^ itm = 0, in which case he walks away with itm ) if
where U i;t+1;m is the continuation utility manager m receives from t + 1 on if the relationship is not terminated, andŨ i;t+1;m is the continuation utility he receives if separation occurs. Thus, he will choose full utilization if and only if the sum of the reward and the change in the continuation value exceeds the value of the resources. If the manager chooses any utilization level other than full utilization, the owner has no incentive to pay the reward and therefore will not. If the manager fully utilizes resources itm , the owner will pay the promised reward
where i;t+1;m and~ i;t+1;m are, respectively, owner i's continuation value if he pays the promised reward and if he does not pay the promised reward. Thus, the change in continuation value of the …rm must exceed the size of the promised bonus. We know from MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) and Levin (2003) that (2) and (3) can be pooled together to provide necessary and su¢ cient conditions for the manager to choose full utilization and the principal to pay the promised reward. That is, if we let S i;t+1:m = U i;t+1;m + i;t+1;m andS i;t+1;m =Ũ i;t+1;m +~ i;t+1;m , we need that
is satis…ed.S i;t+1;m is in principle not a straightforward object, since other relationships within the …rm may be altered, and the owner may choose to renege on multiple managers simultaneously. However, the candidate equilibrium described above involves multilateral punishment: an owner's choice to renege on a single manager leads all current and potential future managers to stop cooperating 14 . The only potentially appealing reneging temptation on the part of the owner, then, is one in which he pays no bonuses whatsoever. This allows us to focus only on the aggregate reneging temptation, which can be expressed as
where S i;t+1 represents the total pro…ts generated by the owner and the managers she hires net of their outside opportunities, andS i;t+1 = 0 is the …rm's outside option. Finally, note that S i;t+1 depends on the whole future stream of prices and future promises. Given a conjecture fp g 1 =t that is shared by the owner and the managers, S it+1 is given by
(6) fp g 1 =t are determined jointly by the production capabilities and relational contracts of all the …rms in the economy as well as demand conditions.
Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Throughout, we will focus on rational expectations equilibria in which all …rms conjectured the same price sequence, and this price sequence in fact clears the market in each period. Because it is not essential for the model, assume the capital rental rate is exogenously …xed at R.
De…nition 1 A rational-expectations equilibrium (REE) is a sequence of prices fp t g 1 t=1 , a sequence of capital and management choices fK it ; M it g it , a sequence of relational contracts f itm ; s itm ; b itm g itm , and a sequence of utilization choices , owner i optimally o¤ers relational contract f tm ; s tm ; b tm g tm and chooses capital and management levels fK it ; M it g t 3. fp t g 1 t=1 clears the output market for all t Throughout, I will focus on stationary REEs with constant prices p t = p, since they are the direct analogue of the (unique) stationary competitive equilibrium in the completecontracts case. The following proposition establishes existence and uniqueness of a stationary REE. 15 The proof is constructive.
Theorem 1 Suppose D is smooth, decreasing, and satis…es
, and suppose is absolutely continuous. There exists a unique stationary REE.
Proof. Suppose all …rms conjecture price sequence p t = p for all t. I will show that aggregate supply is well-de…ned and stationary. Fix a …rm i and assume all other …rms use a stationary relational contract f jtm ; s jtm ; b jtm g = f jm ; s jm ; b jm g and choose constant capital and management levels fK jt ; M jt g = fK j ; M j g. Further, suppose …rm i chooses constant capital and management levels fK it ; M it g = fK i ; M i g. From …rm i's perspective, the environment is stationary. By Levin (2003) , …rm i can replicate any optimal relational contract with a stationary relational contract. Thus, f itm ; s itm ; b itm g = f im ; s im ; b im g, which rationalizes the …rm's choice of a constant capital and management sequence. This implies a constant aggregate production sequence, which yields aggregate supply S (p). The remaining task is to …nd the constant price sequence consistent with supply and demand in each period. Aggregate supply is upward-sloping, since future competitive rents, and hence today's output, are increasing in p for all …rms. Further, it is smooth, since is absolutely continuous. Since aggregate demand has an in…nite choke price and is decreasing, smooth, and asymptotes to 0, existence and uniqueness of such a price p follows.
Equilibrium Optimal Relational Contracts
The remaining sections characterize optimal relational contracts in the stationary REE and examine the aggregate implications of dynamic enforcement constraints. The proof of Theorem 1 charts a roadmap for how to construct the stationary REE: (1) …x output prices p t = p and solve for each …rm's optimal stationary relational contract, (2) aggregate up the production of individual …rms to generate the industry supply curve S (p), and (3) solve for the equilibrium price p that satis…es S (p ) = D (p ).
By Assumption 1, production is concave in individual utilization levels. Since managers are symmetric, any optimal relational contract will involve im = i for all m. At the steady state, per period pro…ts for …rm i are given by
In an optimal relational contract, …rms maximize their per-period pro…ts subject to their pooled dynamic enforcement constraint. That is, each …rm takes p as given and solves
subject to
In the formulation of the production function, I have assumed that if all managers choose the same utilization levels, production exhibits decreasing returns to scale in K and M . This is a standard assumption in models in which …rms of di¤erent productivities coexist in equilibrium (e.g. Lucas (1978) ). 16 Alternatively, the entire model can be reformulated as a monopolistic competition model in which each …rm's production exhibits constant returns to scale in K and M , but each …rm faces a downward-sloping demand curve (see Appendix B). Proposition 7 in the appendix shows that if revenues exhibit constant returns in K and M , there does not exist an REE. With constant returns to scale, equilibrium prices will be such that …rms that produce make zero pro…ts, which in turn precludes such …rms from producing at all. We can think of the interest rate the …rm faces as an e¤ective interest rate that combines …rm turnover (i.e. an exogenous probability of …rm destruction), pure time preferences, monitoring technology on the part of the …rm (i.e. can the …rm see whether or not a manager has chosen the correct utilization level?), social connections on the part of the population of managers (i.e. can future managers see if the owner has paid the promised rewards?). 17 In other words, think of r as fairly large. The next proposition characterizes the solution to the constrained problem (7) subject to (8).
Proposition 2 In this model, the solution to the constrained problem satis…es
where 0 (' i ; p) 1 is (weakly) increasing in output prices and (weakly) decreasing in the capital rental rate, the outside options of managers, and the …rm's e¤ective discount rate. Further, if we de…ne
Equilibrium total factor productivity is given by
ine¢ ciently broad) …rms. 17 Proposition 8 in the appendix shows that if with probability q O and q M , deviations by the owner and by each manager, respectively, are publicly detected, and if with probability 1 q X , the …rm exogenously exits the industry, then the e¤ective interest rate isr =
Figure 2 characterizes this solution as a function of '. In the complete contracts model,
is not large enough for the …rm to cover its …xed costs of production and (' i ; p) = F B otherwise. When formal contracts are unavailable, there are three additional regions. For ' S ' i < ' L ; the …rm should produce but is unable to. For ' L ' i < ' H , the dynamic enforcement constraint is binding, and the …rm is unable to produce e¢ ciently. For ' i ' H , the …rm is unconstrained and thus produces according to …rst-best. Equilibrium total factor productivity for a …rm with ability ' i is proportional to the …rst-best total factor productivity for a …rm of ability
(' i ; p). The relationship between equilibrium TFP and …rst-best TFP, holding prices constant is shown in Figure 3 .
Figure 3: Equilibrium and FB TFP levels for given prices A …rm's total factor productivity depends on the e¤ective discount rate a …rm faces and is therefore decreasing in …rm turnover and increasing in the clarity with which deviations are communicated. The quality of communication technology and the strength of social connections may therefore play a role in determining a …rm's total factor productivity. In addition, total factor productivity is jointly determined with the equilibrium price-a …rm's production possibilities set is endogenous to market conditions, unlike in the standard Neoclassical growth model.
In the complete-contracts competitive equilibrium, …rms of heterogeneous total factor productivity coexist in equilibrium. However, because …rms are unconstrained and face identical factor prices, …rms'marginal productivities are equalized. Relative to this benchmark, in the absence of formal contracts, …rms of heterogeneous marginal productivity coexist in equilibrium: high-ability …rms are less constrained, implying a lower marginal productivity. Further, high-ability …rms are able to sustain higher levels of decentralization and therefore have higher total factor productivity. This implies a negative relationship between total factor productivity and marginal productivity in equilibrium.
So far, I have derived that, for a constant price p, a …rm of ability ' produces y ('; p). If all …rms expect the same constant price p, then aggregate supply is given by
where ' L (p) is the cuto¤ value of ability such that ' < ' L (p) implies that a …rm of ability ' will not have enough credibility to sustain any positive level of decentralization if prices are constant at p. It is worth noting that ' L (p) is continuous and decreasing in p: if prices are higher, then future competitive rents are higher, and therefore …rms with lower ability will be able to sustain positive levels of decentralization. Further, y ('; p) is increasing in p: unconstrained …rms choose to produce more if prices are higher, and constrained …rms are able to produce more, because their future competitive rents are greater. Therefore, S (p) is strictly increasing in p. Equilibrium prices, p therefore solve D (p ) = S (p ) in each period.
E¢ ciency of REE
We now examine some of the properties of the stationary rational expectations equilibrium derived in the previous section. To build intuition for the nature of the ine¢ ciencies in this economy, let
f (K; M; ; '; p ; F ) : (K; M; ; '; p ; F ) rM g denote the optimal per-period pro…ts of a …rm with ability ' when equilibrium prices are p , and let ('; p ) denote the shadow cost of the dynamic enforcement constraint at the optimum. By the envelope theorem,
In addition to the static e¤ect on per-period pro…ts, a reduction in …xed costs increases future pro…ts-this in turn increases the …rm's credibility and allows it to increase decentralization. The dynamic e¤ect is greater the more constrained the …rm is. From the previous section, we know that ('; p ) is increasing in '. It can be shown (by evaluating the …rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian at the constrained optimum) that
. From this, we see that ('; p ; F ) is decreasing in ' (indeed, (' L (p ) ; p ; F ) = 1 and ('; p ; F ) = 0 for ' ' H (p )). Higher ability …rms are less constrained in equilibrium, and therefore bene…t less from an increase in future pro…ts.
Ignoring potential price e¤ects, suppose a social planner can permanently redistribute …xed costs of production among existing …rms, allocating …xed costs F (') to a …rm of ability '. The planner's problem is
Proposition 3 A social planner who maximizes (9) subject to (10) will choose
Proof. See Appendix.
The solution to this problem satis…es
and F (') < F otherwise. That is, in the optimal reallocation, high-ability …rms are taxed and lowability …rms are subsidized: rents are allocated too progressively. Of course, this is a partial equilibrium statement, since reallocating …xed costs of production would lead to an increase in output and hence a reduction in prices. Even accounting for equilibrium changes in the price level, a social planner could improve upon the allocation. To see this, suppose is unbounded from above, so that for any price level p, there will be a positive mass of …rms with ' i > ' H (p) + for some small but positive , so they are unconstrained. Consider a persistent proportional output tax on such …rms. Let T ( ) be tax revenues generated by this tax scheme, and de…ne p to solve
Total per-period welfare is given by
Producer surplus of untaxed …rms
Producer surplus of taxed …rms (11)
where (p; '; ) is the equilibrium per-period pro…ts a …rm with ability ' receives if prices are given by p and it faces a tax , so that the e¤ective prices it faces are (1 ) p.
Proof. See appendix. The basic idea of the proof is that a small increase in taxes on unconstrained …rms leads to a price increase, which induces a transfer from consumers to the constrained …rms. Statically, this is merely a transfer. However, the dynamic e¤ects of this transfer in each period result in a relaxation of the dynamic enforcement constraint and hence an increase in e¢ ciency of the constrained …rms. This proposition highlights the nature of the ine¢ ciencies: high-ability …rms induce a …rst-order negative pecuniary externality on low-ability …rms. The result of this is that competitive rents are allocated too progressively.
A full treatment of optimal corporate taxation in the presence of credibility constraints is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is interesting to note that, in contrast to classical results on optimal tax theory (Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) ), taxing the output of a subset of …rms may lead to an increase in total surplus. This is because, in the Neoclassical model of production that Diamond and Mirrlees (and the ensuing literature) study, absent any distortionary taxes on production, aggregate production is carried out e¢ ciently. That is, there is no misallocation of productive resources across independent production units.
Empirical Implications Within and Across Countries
This section explores two sets of empirical implications of this model. First, I examine the model's within-country implications for …rm-level productivity changes in response to persistent changes in aggregate demand. Second, I consider its implications for cross-country di¤erences in the distribution of …rm-level productivity. Both sets of implications will build upon the idea that low-ability …rms are more sensitive than high-ability …rms to changes in competitive rents. To formalize this, recall that, in equilibrium, the total factor productivity for a …rm with ability ' is given by
The following proposition shows that the sensitivity of total factor productivity to future competitive rents is greater for low-ability …rms than for high-ability …rms.
Proposition 4 log A ('; p; F ) is increasing and exhibits decreasing di¤erences in ('; F; p).
Proof. See appendix.
In response to an unexpected, persistent increase (decrease) in aggregate demand, this proposition suggests that more constrained …rms will see a proportionally larger increase (decrease) in their productivity than less constrained …rms. This is consistent with the micro data from Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001) on …rm-level responses to the business cycle from 1979 to 1989. Section 6.1 explores this implication.
In Section 6.2, I compare productivity distributions across countries that di¤er in the strength of formal contracting institutions. An increase in the strength of formal contracting institutions reduces the importance of credibility in sustaining decentralization, and therefore disproportionately bene…ts low-ability …rms. This leads to a compression of the left tail and a reduction in productivity dispersion. These e¤ects hold even after accounting for the general equilibrium e¤ects that result (provided that the price e¤ects are not too large): if all …rms produce more at a given price, equilibrium prices must fall. This reduction in prices in equilibrium reduces the output of high ability, unconstrained …rms, which leads to a compression in the distribution of output across …rms.
Responses to Sustained Changes in Aggregate Demand
This section analyzes …rm-level responses to unexpected, sustained changes in aggregate demand. Suppose initially, aggregate demand is given by D (p; M ). We will compare the steady state equilibrium in this economy to that of two other economies: one in which aggregate demand is given by D (p; L ) (i.e. a low-demand economy) and one in which aggregate demand is D (p; H ). Throughout, assume D is increasing in and H > M > L . In equilibrium, it will be the case that
Proposition 7 implies that all surviving …rms will experience an increase (weakly) in productivity in H relative to M , and a decrease (weakly) in productivity in L relative to M . If we view changes in aggregate demand as the dawning of a boom or a bust, then the model predicts pro-cyclical within-…rm productivity changes. This contrasts with an e¢ ciency wage story: downward-rigid wages and increased unemployment during recessions should enable …rms to implement higher levels of e¤ort, and thus we would expect to see within-…rm productivity increase during a recession. Further, since A exhibits decreasing di¤erences in ('; p), the incidence of these changes will be primarily centered around lowability …rms: …rms whose futures are not necessarily bright.
Macroeconomic evidence, dating back to at least Hultgren (1960) , strongly suggests that aggregate productivity is pro-cyclical.
18 Bartelsman and Doms (2000) decompose the changes in aggregate productivity into between-and within-…rm productivity changes over the period of 1977-1987 and …nd that this procyclicality was driven by within-…rm productivity declines during the slump that occurred between 1977 and 1982 and within-…rm productivity increases during the boom that occurred between 1982 and 1987. Within-…rm productivity changes were found to be procyclical. Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001) decompose these productivity changes further. They examine …rm-level changes in productivity over the period between 1979 and 1988. They …nd that the productivity of …rms with bright long-run prospects (as predicted by variables that are observable in 1979) was procyclical, but not very much so. Firms with poor long-run predicted prospects, on the other hand, exhibited much greater degrees of procyclicality. This is consistent with the predictions of Proposition 4, as shown in Figure  4 : …rms with observably dim prospects (low-ability …rms) are expected to be much more sensitive to changes in aggregate demand. 
Di¤erences in Formal Contracting Institutions
Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (Forthcoming) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009) document both substantial dispersion in within-country productivity, controlling for industry composition, and heterogeneity in productivity dispersion across countries. Loosely speaking, there is more productivity dispersion in less-developed countries. Other authors have similarly documented "... huge variation among countries in the speed and quality of courts." (Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2003) ). The objective of this section is to connect these two sets of facts.
To do so, I begin by extending the model to allow for imperfect formal contracts that can supplement relational contracts. This is in line with Johnson, McMillan, and Woodru¤ (2002) 's …nding that "... entrepreneurs who say the courts are e¤ective have measurably more trust in their trading partners... ." With stronger formal contracting institutions, credibility becomes relatively less important for sustaining decentralization, consistent with the positive correlation between Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006)'s country-level measure of "rule of law" and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (Forthcoming)'s measure of decentralized decision making in organizations. Since in equilibrium, low-ability …rms are more constrained by lack of credibility, an improvement in formal contracting institutions will disproportionately bene…t such …rms.
Imperfect Formal Contracts
Suppose a third-party enforcer observes itm and^ itm . However, the third-party enforcer will only enforce deviations that are at least (1 !)-egregious, for ! 2 [0; 1], which implies that the formal portion of the contract can be contingent on whether or not itm
, and hence s itm ( itm = 0) can be set to 1. Enforcement is otherwise costless. Throughout, I will restrict attention to "full-utilization" relational contracts, in which any choice^ itm < itm is viewed as a deviation, which results in punishment. 19 We refer to ! as the quality of formal contracting institutions. Given quality !, suppose the principal entrusts manager m with itm resources and promises to pay a reward b itm if and only if he fully utilizes them. Manager m will choose full utilization over^ itm = ! itm if and only if
and following full utilization, the owner will pay the promised reward if and only if 1 1 + r i;t+1;`
As always, these constraints can be pooled within the pair and across all managers in the …rm to give
Stationarity and manager symmetry implies that S it+1 = 1+r r i ,S it+1 (!) = 1+r r max f~ i (!) ; 0g, M it = M i , and it`= i . Here,~ i (!) represents the per-period pro…ts that …rm i can earn 19 This is consequential: relaxing this assumption enables each …rm to achieve …rst-best utilization levels by setting i = In other words, the strength of the formal contracting institutions enters the (DE) constraint as an e¤ective decrease in the interest rate. Under the current formulation, an increase in ! a¤ects all …rms equally, but since some …rms are more constrained than others, this increase in ! disproportionately bene…ts such …rms. Under this formulation, the following proposition is true.
Proposition 5 log y ('; p; F; !) and log A ('; p; F; !) are increasing in ! and exhibit decreasing di¤erences in ('; !).
Proof. See appendix. Holding prices constant, an increase in ! leads to an increase in total factor productivity and output. Further, low-ability …rms disproportionately bene…t from this increase in !. This leads to a convergence in the productivity distribution among existing …rms. However, it will also potential lead to the entry of low-ability …rms. The new entrants and all existing …rms produce more the greater is !, so supply increases and therefore prices must fall. Let
This decrease in prices leads to a net reduction in production of unconstrained …rms, since the increase in ! does not allow them to produce more.
Proposition 6 Suppose that either (a) ' has a log-convex distribution and j" D;p j > 1 or (b) ' has a log-concave distribution and j" D;p j < 1. Then V ar (A ('; p ! ; !)j ' ' ! L ) is greater for ! = 0 than for ! = 1. Additionally, there exists some' ! such that
Evidence
The three main predictions from the previous section are: (1) productivity dispersion is lower in high-! countries, (2) the distribution of productivity in high-! countries will have a thinner left tail, and (3) output (…rm-size) dispersion is lower in high ! countries. In 20 For what follows, I will assume~ i (!) < 0 for all ! and for all i, though considering the case wherẽ i (!) > 0 could be an interesting extension. One way of rationalizing~ i (!) < 0 is that no matter how strong a formal contract is, certain non-contractible actions must be taken for any production to take place. A …rm is unlikely to survive if its management team works "to rule." order to examine (1), I gathered country-level measures of (a) labor productivity dispersion from Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (Forthcoming) , 2122 (b) the quality of formal contracting institutions ("Rule of Law") from Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2006), 2324 and (c) "Private Credit" from Manova (2011), 25 which proxies for the quality of capital markets. Figure 5 plots labor productivity dispersion against the measure of formal contracting institutions and con…rms that countries with higher measures of formal contracting institutions tend to have less productivity dispersion. Of course, "Rule of Law" is not the only factor that varies across countries. If, as we would expect, "Rule of Law" is highly correlated with the quality of capital markets, which in turn largely determine the level of productivity dispersion in a country, then Figure 5 may simply be capturing this relationship. I show in …gure 6 that the relationship between "Rule of Law" and productivity dispersion is robust to controlling for Manova (2011)'s measure of the quality of capital markets. 21 Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (Forthcoming) construct a harmonized database (standardizing de…nitions for meaningful cross-country comparisons) that covers 24 industrial and emerging economies from the 1990s. 22 Productivity measures in the empirical literature are revenue-based, which con ‡ates technological and market-power considerations (see Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008) ). In this model, …rms produce homogeneous goods and do not have market power, allowing me to sidestep these issues. 23 This commonly used measure in the international trade literature is an aggregate survey indicator "measuring the extent to which agents have con…dence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement... ." The values I use are from 2005. 24 The results are qualitatively similar using Gwartney and Lawson (2001) 's measure of economic freedom or either of Djankov, et. al. (2003) 's measures of the quality of court enforcement.
25 "Private credit" is the amount of credit by banks and other …nancial intermediaries to the private sector as a share of GDP during the years 1985-1995. For the second prediction, Figure 7 shows Hsieh and Klenow (2009)'s plots of the log (T F P ) distributions in India and the U.S., controlling for industry composition. A striking feature is the thickness of the left tail of productivity in India relative to the U.S.. In contrast, a model of Cobb-Douglas production with capital constraints would suggest that low-! environments should see a thick right tail of …nancially constrained, and therefore excessively high average-productivity, …rms. With regards to prediction (3), the evidence is limited. Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk (2008) show that establishment size is less variable in countries with higher GDP per capita (which is correlated with rule of law).
26 Others (Tybout (2000) , Ayyagari, Demirguc-Kunt, and Beck (2003) ) describe the phenomenon of the "missing middle" in developing countries: in high-income countries, medium-sized …rms are responsible for a much larger share of GDP ( 50%) than in low-income countries ( 17%). Low-income countries tend to be dominated by …rms that are either very small, often informal, or very large. Though this model does not literally generate a "missing middle," an extension, along the lines of Peters (2011a) potentially could. In such an extension, …rms can potentially choose between two technologies: one is a low productivity (traditional) technology that does not require the owner to decentralize decision-making to managers, and the other (modern) technology is given by the current model. For su¢ ciently weak contracting institutions, both types of …rms could coexist in equilibrium-low-ability owners will choose the traditional technologies, and owners with su¢ ciently high ability to sustain decentralization will choose the modern technology. Improved formal contracting will cause some marginal traditional producers to switch to modern technologies. This will lead to increased output and hence decreased prices, which could in turn drive out some of the less productive traditional producers.
Figure 7: log (T F P ) distribution (Hsieh and Klenow)
Alternative Solutions to the Credibility Problem
An entrepreneur who is constrained by the limited credibility of his promises may pursue policies aimed at relaxing this constraint. For example, he may purchase capital that is speci…c to the …rm and therefore loses value if the …rm is dissolved. In a multiproduct …rm, he may leverage the pro…ts earned in one product line as collateral for promises made to managers responsible for other product lines. Finally, he may hire managers with whom he interacts more frequently (perhaps relatives). Such policies are likely to be more prevalent in countries with poor formal contracting institutions.
Though privately (and potentially socially) bene…cial, these alternative …rm-level policies do not eliminate the ine¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium, however. A …rm investing in capital that is otherwise suboptimally …rm-speci…c will have ine¢ ciently low capital productivity. A conglomerate pursuing breadth for the sake of leveraging its pro…ts may crowd out more e¢ cient (but narrow) producers of other goods. Firms may overemploy trustworthy family members, even if they are not a good …t for the job; further, skilled entrepreneurs may lack the familial connections necessary to pro…tably expand his enterprise to its optimal size. To the extent that a …rm's size and scope is determined by factors orthogonal to its marginal pro…tability, the allocation of pro…ts will be ine¢ cient: some …rms will be too small and others will be too large.
Discussion and Conclusion
Following Chandler (1962) , I have argued that in order for a large …rm to produce e¢ ciently, the owner of the …rm must decentralize daily operating decisions to a team of managers. Absent perfect formal contracts, decentralization requires trust: the owner must trust that the managers will not make reckless decisions for their own private gains, and the managers must trust that the owner will reward them appropriately for judiciously using the …rm's resources. This paper views trust as credibility in a relational contract-the credibility of the owner's promises is derived from the value of the owner's reputation in the labor market. This value is, in turn, limited by the …rm's potential future competitive rents. Competitive rents, credibility, and therefore …rms' decentralization levels and hence productivity are jointly determined in industry equilibrium.
The theory of relational contracts generates a mechanism through which future pro…ts can be an important determinant of current productivity, resulting in …rm-level income e¤ects that have e¢ ciency consequences. The model presented in this paper argues that these …rm-level income e¤ects are decreasing-the marginal returns to a dollar-a-day increase in pro…ts is higher for less productive …rms-and therefore, pro…ts are ine¢ ciently concentrated at the top in a competitive equilibrium. On the normative side, this view suggests that in weak formal-contracting environments, a progressive corporate tax may improve aggregate productivity by distorting production away from high average-but low marginal-productivity …rms to low average-but high marginal-productivity …rms.
Other policies that reduce the concentration of pro…ts can have similar e¤ects. Consider two countries opening up to trade. In a Melitz (2003) model of heterogeneous …rms, highability-and hence high pro…tability-…rms will export. In so doing, they will drive up domestic factor prices, reducing the pro…tability of those …rms that do not export (as well as the marginal exporting …rms). Trade liberalization therefore leads to a further concentration of pro…ts at the top. If the countries involved have poor formal contracting institutions, this concentration of pro…ts could result in a reduction in aggregate productivity among the smaller …rms, and these losses may exceed the Melitz (2003) reallocation bene…ts. Trade liberalization, therefore, may harm aggregate productivity in countries with weak formal contracting institutions.
On the positive side, low-ability …rms face tighter credibility constraints, making their productivity more sensitive to the environment in which they operate. This e¤ect forms the basis for two sets of empirical implications: (1) within-country, over time, and (2) acrosscountry. Low-ability …rms are uniformly more responsive to persistent changes in aggregate demand, which is consistent with micro evidence on …rm-level productivity responses to business cycles (Baily, Bartelsman, and Haltiwanger (2001) ). Improvements in the strength of formal contracting institutions reduce the importance of credibility in sustaining decentralization and therefore disproportionately improve the productivity of low-ability …rms, leading to a reduction in the dispersion of productivity. Cross-country evidence supports the predictions of an upward compression of the left tail of the productivity distribution in high rule-of-law countries and a negative relationship between the strength of formal contracting institutions and productivity dispersion.
These patterns, while potentially of independent interest, are only indirect tests of the theory. The underlying causal mechanisms involved are (1) an increase in expected future pro…ts increases current productivity and (2) the e¤ect of an increase in future pro…ts on current productivity is decreasing in future pro…ts. An important future direction for the view proposed in this paper is establishing direct evidence of these mechanisms.
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This paper has focused on the distortions that arise in the steady state of an economy. Taking a more dynamic view, if we think of …rm growth as being made possible only by non-contractible investments by a …rm's managers, then the rate at which a …rm grows may be limited by its medium-run pro…tability. Small, but productive, …rms may be unable to grow, and as a result, there may be ine¢ ciently slow industrial churn in countries with weak formal contracting institutions. Such a model may be able to generate results consistent with the recent Hsieh and Klenow (2012) facts on …rm growth.
Appendix A: Proofs and Derivations
Solution to the Model Proposition 7 If production exhibits constant returns to scale in labor and management, there does not exist an REE.
Proof. Suppose production is
. Then, in period t, the …rm with the highest value of ' i will continue to produce as long as p t y it RK it (W + it ) M it 0. Market clearing with …nite demand thus implies that p t y it RK it (W + it ) M it = 0 for all t. This in turn implies that the left-hand side of the dynamic enforcement constraint is equal to F , which implies that no production can be sustained.
Proposition 8 Suppose with probability q O , deviations by the owner are publicly detected, and with probability q M , deviations by a manager are publicly detected. Finally, suppose with probability 1 q X , the …rm exogenously is forced to exit the industry. Then the e¤ective interest rate in
Proof. If we rewrite (2) and (3) recognizing that (a) the owner will choose s t to pin each manager to his (IR) constraint and that (b) the optimal relational contract will be stationary, and we introduce q O ; q M ; q X > 0, these become
If we pool these across agents, this becomes
and therefore a reward scheme supporting i exists if and only if i r q O q M q X M i i rM i i , which is the desired result.
where 0 (') 1 is (weakly) increasing in p and (weakly) decreasing in R; W , and r. Further,
where
Proof. Throughout this proof, I drop the i subscript for the …rm. Proposition 3 allows us to focus on the stationary problem. Manager symmetry and decreasing returns to utilization imply that m = for all m 2 [0; M ]. The …rm's problem is then
Since an increase in K increases the objective function as well as the left-hand side of the constraint, capital will be chosen e¢ ciently, given M and . De…ne
The …rm's problem is then to max (K (M; ) ; M; ) subject to (K (M; ) ; M; ) rM . Suppose the …rm is constrained at the optimum. De…ne M ( ) such that the constraint holds with equality. The unconstrained problem is then
Taking …rst-order conditions, the …rm chooses such that
Implicitly di¤eren-tiating the constraint with respect to and substituting this into the …rst-order condition yields
and we know from the constraint that
(12) implies
and substituting this into (13), we have that solves a quadratic equation. The linearity of M ( ) results from the assumption that production is constant returns to scale in (K; M; ). Without this assumption, would be the solution to a nonlinear equation. If we de…ne ' L as in the statement of the proposition, the solution to this quadratic equation is
.
Optimal capital and management are linear in . It is then easy to show that the constraint is binding for ' < ' H . For ' ' H , the solution to the constrained problem is the same as the solution to the unconstrained problem.
Structure of Ine¢ ciencies
Proposition 3 Suppose a social planner wants to
F (with Lagrange multiplier 1 + ). The optimal solution satis…es
Proof. The social planner's Lagrangian is
Any solution will involve ('; p ; F (')) = . In order for ('; p ; F (')) = (' 0 ; p ; F (' 0 )) for all '; ' 0 , it must be the case that F (') =
Theorem 2 Let W ( ) be as de…ned in (11). Then W 0 (0) > 0.
Proof. At = 0 and p 0 , a marginal increase in leads to a reduction in production. In order for markets to clear, prices must increase. Thus, dp d =0;p 0 > 0. We proceed by examining the e¤ects of a marginal increase in from = 0 on the four expressions in W ( ). Since consumers have quasilinear preferences, the e¤ect of a change in taxes on consumers is straightforward:
denote the revenues that the tax scheme generates from a …rm of ability ', so
Next, using Leibniz's rule,
where > 0 and (p 0 ; '; 0) > 0 and is decreasing in . Finally, since . For applications with ! = 0, denote ('; p; F ) = ('; p; F; 0). Finally, the following de…nitions will be useful in what follows ('; p; F; !) = 1 + 1
and for X 2 f'; p; F; !g,
Lemma 1 log ('; p; F; !) is increasing in and exhibits decreasing di¤erences in ('; p; F; !).
Proof. That log is increasing in ('; p; F; !) follows from their characterizations in the remark above. To examine decreasing di¤erences, we simply must check the cross-partials. For X 2 f'; p; F g, the …rst derivatives are
With some e¤ort, it can be shown that for X; Y 2 f'; p; F; !g, X 6 = Y ,
Since Z X > 0 for all X 2 f'; p; F; !g and > 0,
Proof. Since log A = log ' + log + log F B , log A is increasing in ('; F; p) since log ' is increasing in ' and log is increasing in ('; F; p) from the previous lemma. Since is the only term that contains interactions, log A exhibits decreasing di¤erences in ('; F; p) if log exhibits decreasing di¤erences in ('; F; p), which it does by the previous lemma.which is negative.
Proof. Note that
log A = log ' + log + log F B log y = log y F B + log . y F B does not depend directly on !. Since is increasing in !, log A and log y are increasing in !. The only terms in log A and log y that depend both on ' and ! are the log term. We know from the lemma that log exhibits decreasing di¤erences in ('; !). The proposition then follows.
Industry Equilibrium Comparative Statics
This section provides a proof of proposition 9. It proceeds …rst by establishing three lemmas. The …rst lemma connects the equilibrium price response to properties of the industry supply and demand curves. The second lemma shows that when price e¤ects are small (large), the equilibrium ability cuto¤ is decreasing (increasing) in the strength of formal contracts. The third lemma shows that the lowest observed productivity level will be lower when formal contracts are weaker. Lemma 4 shows that the slope of TFP with respect to ability is higher when formal contracts are weaker. These lemmas are used in the proof of proposition 9.
Proof. If we totally di¤erentiate the market-clearing condition and rearrange, we get the following dp
We now seek to derive a relationship between
and therefore, using Leibniz's rule,
, so the result follows.
Therefore, 
This is less than '
< 0 for all !, and it is greater than '
Proof. We know that (' Proof. We know that
If this expression is negative, then
' ('; p; F; 0). Note that
(1 + ) = 1 (1 + 2 ) (1 + ) @ @' < 0; so 1 (1 + ) is minimized at ' H (and all ' > ' H ), where it equals 1 2 1 , which is positive, since < 1 2 since r < 1.
Proposition 6 Suppose that either (a) ' has a log-convex distribution and j" D;p j > 1 or (b) ' has a log-concave distribution and j" D;p j < 1. Then V ar (A ('; p ! ; !)j ' ' ! L ) is greater for ! = 0 than for ! = 1. Additionally, there exists some' ! such that y ('; p ! ; !) is increasing in ! for ' <' ! and decreasing in ! for ' >' ! .
Proof. From the previous lemma, we know that
for all ' ' 0 L . Tang and See (2009) show that if f and g are functions of a random variable and jf j < jgj almost everywhere, then V ar (f ) < V ar (g). This implies that
If j" D;p j > 1 and ' is log-convex, then we have that V ar ('j ' k) is increasing in k (see Burdett 1996) , and the result follows, since ' . When j" D;p j > 1, all …rms with ' <' ! expand production, and all …rms with ' >' ! reduce production. When j" D;p j < 1, there is a cuto¤ value' ! < ' H such that all …rms with ' <' ! expand production and all …rms with ' >' ! reduce production.
Remark 2 In fact the Burdett 1996 result shows that a su¢ cient condition for V ar ('j ' k) to be increasing in k is that the triple cumulative integration of ' is log-convex, which is a signi…cantly weaker condition.
Remark 3 For the j" D;p j > 1 case, it can be seen that this result will hold for distributions that are not "too log-concave" in the sense that all that is required is that where ' is the approximation point for a variance approximation. Similarly, if j" D;p j < 1, then this result will hold for distributions that are not "too log-convex."
therefore have lower output prices. Distortions in the allocation of productive resources across …rms can then be inferred from heterogeneity in T F P R. Suppose each …rm faces a demand curve of the form y =Lp ' . We know from the previous analysis that the unconstrained solution to this problem is
TFPR is then
TFPR is thus independent of' if and only if~ +~ = 1, that is, if production exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and labor, then TFPR is independent of'. This restriction amounts to 1 = ~ +~ +~ = 1 +~ or~ = 1 > 0.
Appendix C: Free Entry
In the main text of the paper, I have assumed that there is a mass N = 1 of …rms. This appendix follows Hopenhayn (1992) in endogenizing the mass of …rms in the economy. Suppose there is a period 0 at which a …rm can pay a cost F e to enter the economy and take a productivity potential draw ' ('). Throughout, I will focus on the stationary REE. The free entry condition is then given by
Since D is downward-sloping and S is increasing in p and N , p (N ) is decreasing in N . The free entry condition pins down N by (p (N ) ) rF e = 0. Since is increasing in p, this is monotonically decreasing in N . Since the choke price is in…nity, we will have that (p (0)) > rF e . As long as p N < rF e for someN large, there will be a unique value N that satis…es the free entry condition.
